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THE DETERMINATION OF ATTITUDE DEVIATION LIMITS FOR TERMINATING 
A NON-NOMINAL TRANSLUNAH INJECTION MANEUVER 
By Charles T .  Hyle and Alexander H. Treadway 
SUMMARY 
This report  contains an ana lys i s  of t he  t rans lunar  i n j ec t ion  (TLI)  
maneuver and various f ac to r s  a f f ec t ing  ea r ly  terminat ion requirements. 
A co r re l a t ion  between vehic le  a t t i t u d e  and maneuver terminat ion require- 
ments i s  drawn. 
measurement un i t  ( I M U )  platforms and t ranspos i t ion  and docking (T&D) 
communications and l igh t ing  cons t r a in t s ,  t o t a l  a t t i t u d e  l i m i t s  which 
insure safe  operations and maximum opportunity for  a circumlunw a l t e rna te  
mission are  b6' and -43.4' i n  p i t ch  and 52' and -66' i n  yaw. Because of 
t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  of inconsis tent  and unfamiliar IMU alignments a t  T L I  
i g n i t j  on md because s impl ic i ty  has always served bes t  , a t o t a l  a t t i t u d e  
deviat ion of 245' i n  either p i t ch  or  yaw i s  recommended as the  TLI 
s hut-down c r  i t e r  i a. 
It was found t h a t ,  disregarding a gimbal locked ST-124 o r  i n e r t i a l  
TNTRODUCTI ON 
Because the  T L I  maneuver w i l l  occur without bene f i t  of ground 
t racking ,  a real-time evaluation of t h i s  l a rge  t h r u s t  maneuver m u s t  be 
made so le ly  by the  crew using onboard displays.  I n  reference 1, it was 
determined that. the  two indeFendeQt spacecraf t  a t t i t u d e  reference frames 
and the  associated information displayed on t h e  two f l i g h t  d i r ec to r  
a t t i t u d e  ind ica tors  ( F D A I ' s )  provided t h e  most e f f ec t ive  maneuver 
monitoring displays.  
inary TLI  shutdown l i m i t s  of 15' a t t i t u d e  deviat ion from the  expectrcr or  
1 0  deg/sec i n  r a t e  
the  f a c t  t h a t  launch vehicle  malfunctions character ized by r a t e  buildup 
do not recover and eventually lead  t o  a spacecraf t  E t ruc tura l  break at 
about 70 deg/sec. 
Based on information ava i lab le  a t  t ha t  time , prel in-  
were suggested. The rate l i m i t  i s  based primarily on 
The a t t i t u d e  deviat ion l i m i t  w a s  b w e d  on a conservative estimate 
of allowable ST-124 platform d r i f t  from which a hybrid lunar a l t e rna te  . 
mission could be flown. The conservatism was in+,roduced pr imari ly  
because of the des i r e  t o  keep the  f l i g h t  t r a j e c t o r y  near t o  nominal and 
abort  and a l t e rna te  mission plans m e  general ly  defined r e l a t i v e  t o  the  
nominal. Additional information per t inent  t o  t h e  f i n a l  s e l ec t ion  of 
a t t i t u d e  deviation l i m i t s  has become ava i lab le .  The remainder of t h i s  
2 
paper i s  an examination of these  f ac to r s  and an e f f o r t  t o  def ine t h e  
most meaningful S-IVB T L I  shutdown c r i t e r i a .  
FACTORS AFFECTING TLI ATTITUDE LIMITS 
The following fac tors  d i r e c t l y  o r  i n d i r e c t l y  a f f e c t  t he  choice of an 
a t t i t u d e  deviation l i m i t  f o r  shut t ing  down the  TLI maneuver. 
1. Guidance and cont ro l  malf’unctions producing slow t r a j ec to ry  
deviat ions.  
2. Crew sa fe ty .  
3. Alternate missions. 
4. Abort planning. 
5 .  Communication and l i gh t ing  requirements during t ranspos i t ion  
and docking. 
6. Platform G i m b a l  Lock (launch vehicle  and spacec ra f t ) .  
7. S-IVB Disposal. 
8. Predictable var ia t ions  i n  t h e  nominal burn a t t i t u d e  h is tory .  
Guidance and Control Malflmctions ( S - I n )  
Among the  known S-IVB malf’unctions, those which can r e s u l t  i n  slow 
t r a j e c t o r y  o r  a t t i t u d e  deviat ions,  and the  associateG c r i t i c a l i t i e s ,  i. e .  
p robabi l i ty  of mission loss  per  mi l l ion  f l i g h t s ,  a r e  
1. Loss of i n e r t i a l  a t t i t u d e  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  2300 
2. Loss of a t t i t u d e  e r r o r  commands . . . . . . . . . .  50 
3. Loss of a t t i t u d e  command s igna l  . . . . . . . . . .  4 
4. One actuator  inoperat ive ( n u l l )  . . . . . . . . . .  1700 
5. ST-124 platform d r i f t  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  36 8 
The f i rs t  four of these  malf’unctions are character ized by t h e  low r a t e ,  
l a rge  a t t i t u d e  excursion shown i n  f igure  1. 
i s  l e s s  than  1 deg/sec and, therefore ,  probably not not iceable  t o  the  
It can be seen t h a t  the  r a t e  
3 
crew, which i s ,  of course,  a major problem f o r  the  slow deviat ion 
malfunctions. 
t e s t )  i n  t h e  Saturn computer, t he  guidance f a i l u r e  l i g h t  i s  lit fo r  
a tumbling platform. Therefore, the lo s s  of i n e r t i a l  a t t i t u d e  reference 
i s  the  only f a i l u r e  with a spacecraf t  cue o ther  than a t t i t u d e  deviation. 
F r m  reference 2 ,  these  f a i l u r e s  can occur i n  e i t h e r  a p i t ch  o r  yaw channel, 
and t y p i c a l  deviations can reach 90' within 100 seconds of burn t i m e .  
Additional s tud ie s  involving these malf'unctions a re  being made by Boeing, 
but  are  not expected t o  influence the  S-IVB shutdown l i m i t  s ince  a t t i t u d e  
excursion by i t s e l f  i s  not dangerous. Analysis of t he  f i f t h  malfunction, 
a simulated launch w h i c l e  platform d r i f t ,  Frovides a w a y  t o  examine some 
of t he  actual cons t ra in ts .  The next four sec t ions  d r a w  l a rge ly  from T L I  
t r a j e c t o r y  simulations of a constant ST-124 platform d r i f t .  
Since the re  i s  a platform gimbal check (reasonableness 
Crew Safety 
A t y p i c a l  TLI maneuver and the  ign i t i on  geometry a re  shown i n  
f igures  2 through 7. Because the  i n i t i a l  o r b i t  i s  100-n. m i .  a l t i t u d e  
c i r c u l a r ,  a s ign i f i can t  e r r o r  i n  t h r u s t  d i r ec t ion  would be rzquired t o  
cause an immediate vehicle en t ry .  The primary crew safe ty  consideration 
i s ,  therefore  , t o  always provide a safe  perigee.  References 1 and 3 both 
show t h a t  platform d r i f t  i n  t he  negative p i t ch  (down) d i r ec t ion  r e s u l t s  
i n  immediate entry by the  end of t he  328-second burn. 
per igee,  which i s  the  ea r th  o r b i t  i n se r t ion  GO - NO-GO c r i t e r i a ,  i s  obtained 
by a negative p i tch  r a t e  of -0.175 deg/sec through the burn. 
pos i t ive  p i t ch  r a t e s  produce lower perigees tnan t h e  negative equivalents ,  
pos i t ive  r a t e s  r e s u l t  i n  t he  vehicle ending t h e  burn postpericynthion and 
therefore  a re  not time c r i t i c a l .  
m a x i m u m  allowable a t t i t u d e  deviat ion t h a t  would provide a 75-n. m i .  perigee 
a l t i t u d e  a t  the  end of t he  burn would be (-0.175) (328) = -57'. Examining 
d r i f t  r a t e s  up t o  1. degjsec,  however, shows t h a t  l e s s  than a 75-n. m i .  
perigee r e s u l t s  i f  d r i f t  r a t e s  between -0.2 and -0.4 deg/sec a re  allowed 
t o  continue t o  -57'. From f igure  & t h e  m a x i m u m  deviation insuring at  
l e a s t  a 75-n. m i .  perigee T a  t he  remote p o s s i b i l i t y  t h a t  a 
constant dr i f ' t  of  -0.175 aeg/sec occurred, terminating the  burn a t  a 
52' a t t i t u d e  woul3. mean a cutoff  42 seconds ear ly .  
m u s t  be protected against  a l l  d r i f t  r a t e s .  
A 75-n. m i .  
Although 
Using the  -0.175 deg/sec rate,  the  
i s  -52'. 
Even so ,  t he  t r a j e c t o r y  
Alternate  Missions 
Among the  many possible  a l t e rna te  missions from a non-nomina; T L I ,  
those se lec ted  by the  Apollo Alternate  Mission Vwking group t o  be 
supported by p re f l igh t  planning are  described i n  reference 4. 
a l t e rna te s  involviyg the  mocn require  a burn duration of approximately 
290 seconds, depending on the  time of t he  midcourse maneuver, as shown 
i n  reference 5. This burn duration normally produces an apogee a l t i t u d e  
of about 30 000 n. m i .  
be made from a TLI which produces an apogee of about 30 000 n. m i .  From 
Those 
A CSM flyby of t he  mom ( a l t e r n a t e  4 )  can therefore  
4 
f igure 9 t h e  m a x i m u m  allowable platform d r i f t  r a t e s  which can r e s u l t  i n  
a 30 000-n. m i .  apogee a l t i t u d e  are -0.18 deg/sec and +0.175 deg/sec i n  
p i tch  and +C.125 deg/sec i n  yaw. Respective deviations by t h e  end of 
T L I  are -59' : t57' and 41'. 
apogee a l t i t u d e ,  a c loser  examination i s  necessar j  t o  insure t h a t  t h e  
d i rec t ion  of t he  deviated TLI  i s  within SPS correct ion CapabiliLy. 
the  previous sec t ion  t h e  m a x i m u m  allowable negative p i t ch  l i m i t  was -5.2'. 
Although t h i s  l i m i t  i s  too  r e s t r i c t i v e  f o r  t he  -0.175 deg/sec case,  t he  
flyby could s t i l l  be accomplished by making the  h y k i d  midcourse correct ion 
at about 3 hows  pas t  TLI  L s t e a d  of 4 hours. Alternate lunar  missions 
being planned include : 
Because these l i m i t s  provide only a 30 000-n. m i .  






Hybrid circumlunar with t h e  LM 
(2000 f p s  AV is saved f o r  abor t )  
5B CSM h m a r  o r b i t  
6 L u n a r  o r b i t  with LM; n?  reiidezvous 
7 Return t o  nominal 
For each of these  a l t e rna te s ,  a contingency AV has been subtracted from 
the  ava i lab le ,  and the  r e s u l t ,  as shown i n  t a b l e  I ,  is  an approximate 
AV fo r  use as a "midcourse correction" from a deviating TLI .  Using the  
midcourse AV (AVMcc) for  each a l t e r n a t e  with f igure 10, t h e  maximum 
allawable d r i f t  r a t e  i n  both pos i t i ve  and negative p i tch  and y~.w can be 
establ ished as i n  t a b l e  11. For constant drifts through T L I ,  t h e  r e su l t i ng  
deviations a re  shown i n  t a b l e  111. Figure 10 is  only approximate f o r  
a l t e rna te s  5B,  6 ,  and 7 but  does serve t o  demonstrate t he  wide choice of 
acceptable deviations accordirA, t o  object ives .  It w a s  assumed the  m i d -  
course would be made at T L I  plus  3 hours and the  t o t a l  f l i g h t  time would 
not exceed 160 hours. 
a AVMCC of 7000 f p s  wazi used f o r  a l t e r n a t e  4, and 1000 f p  w a s  saved f o r  
a possible  delay i n  making the  midcourse. 
se lec ted  f o r  only t h e  widLst acceptable s i t u a t i o n ,  t he  a l t e r n a t e  4 
deviations give -54' and +6i0 i n  p i t c t  and -66' and 52' i n  yaw. 
the  -52' l i m i t  f o r  negative p i t ch  takes  precedence. 
a t t i t u d e  deviat ion presented i n  t a b l e  I11 could vary s l i g h t l y  dcpending 
on the month of launch. 
from a 72' launch azimuth i s  the  nominal reference f o r  t h i s  r epor t . )  
Table I V  shows the  va r i a t ion  i n  pericynthion. Also 
Assuming t h a t  l i m i t s  should be 
Again 
It i s  noted the  
(The February 2 ,  1968 first oppoytunity in jec t ion  
Abort Planning 
Through several months of in-house MPAD and TRW discussions,  prelim- 
inary abort  procedures were defined and el-eptually agreed t o  i n  Apollo 
Abort Working Group meetings. One of these  planned abort  techniques 
cons is t s  of shut t ing  down t h e  TLI i f  t h e  crew should need t o  en te r  
immediately. Although such a t ime-cr i t ica l  f a i l u r e  has not been i d e n t i f i e d ,  
t h e  technique, re fer red  t o  as the  f ixed a t t i t u d e  abor t ,  i s  provided f o r  
safet.y. If such 
abort  were required following a slow drift of the S-IVB, normal dispersions 
i n  Derfoming t h e  a b o r t  maneuver result i n  an entry which i s  no longer i n  t h e  
V-versus-y entry in t e r f ace  coryidor.  
entry midcourse maneuver; however, a minimum S-IVB burn i s  required i n  
order t c  have time t o  perform such a midcourse. 
discussed s o  far a r e  k0.2 deg/sec. These r a t e s  and t h e  min-hum S-IVB burn 
t i m e  provides the  max imum deviat ion which insures  t h e  f ixed  a t t i t u d e  abort 
maneuver does not r e s u l t  i n  an en t ry  out of t h e  corr idor  without allowing 
enough t i m e  t o  correct  with the  midcourse. 
study of t he  S-IVB burn t i m e  required t o  generate t h e  boundary shown i n  
f igure ll. This p i tch  a t t i t u d e  deviat ion i s  (0.2 deg/sec) (230 sec )  = 46" 
and (-0.2'/sec) (217 sec )  = -43.4'. For t h e  lunar  mission, t h e  f ixed  
a t t i t u d e  abort  may produce a land landing; however, f o r  t he  E mission 
the  delay t i m e  t o  SPS i gn i t i on  is  es tab l i shed  t o  insure water landing. 
Allowing s ign i f i can t  a t t i t u d e  deviations m a y  a l s o  result i n  land landicgs 
f o r  the E mission. 
Reference 6 contains most of t he  associated d e t a i l s .  
Normally t h i s  would be handled by an 
The m a x i m u m  a l l a r a b l e  r a t e s  
Reference 7 r e su l t ed  i n  a 
Communications and Lighting Constraints 
The impact of deviating t r a j e c t o r i e s  on communication and l i gh t ing  
c o n s t r a h t s  can be examined w i t h  a t y p i c a l  a t t i t u d e  p r o f i l e  providtng 
optimum S-IVB high gain t racking and sunl ight  angles as described i n  
reference 8. At-TLI-plus 15-minutes, t h e  S-IVB woult p i t ch  t o  a p re f l igh t  
loaded a t t i t u d e ,  which it would hold throughout T&D-TLI-plus-2-hours. 
Since t h i s  a t t i t u d e  is optimized t o  give favorable t racking f o r  two hours, 
a small change ir  i n i t i a l  a t t i t u d e ,  as caused by platform d r i f t ,  could 
eas i ly  cause loss  of required telemetry by t h e  ground. Even though the  
crew could hold proper a t t i t u d e  from the  spacecraf t ,  t h i s  capabj l i ty  is 
l o s t  when they separate  f o r  T&D. Although it i s  planned t o  do T&D f o r  
a l l  the a l t e rna te  missions (reference 9 ) ,  t h i s  object ive could be dropped 
fo r  a l t e rna te  4. 
Alternate 5A,  however requires  T&D and, as seen from t a b i e  111, 
could m e a n  a -33' or  a 413 e r r o r  i n  S-IVB ccxnmunication a t t i t u d e .  This 
i s  the i n i t i a l  q r ro r  and does not include addi t iona l  e r r o r  through T&D. 
Possible l i gh t ing  e f f ec t s  which depeni". OIJ the intended lunar  landing 
s ight  and a communications a t t i t u d e  %--e C pic ted  i n  f igure 12. 
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Because the  optimum communicatim a t t i t u d e  and l i g h t i n g  conditions 
vary, max imum a t t i t u d e  deviat ion l i m i t  i s  not e a s i l y  dztermined; however, 
it most l i k e l y  would have t o  be f a i r l y  s m a l l  - probably less than 30'. 
3nly p a r t i a l  t racking would be ava i lab le  then. 
remain on t h e  S-I'JB &id cont ro l  t h e  a t t i t u d e  u n t i l  t h e  ground es tab l i shed  
tinat it w a s  sa fe  f o r  T&D. The crew Could then  execute a manual T&D as 
soon as possible .  
AVMcc required.  
Possibly t h e  crew could 
Delay pas t  TLI-plus-3-hours would increase i n  t h e  
Platform Gimbal Lock (LV and SC) 
Launch vehicle.-  The gimbal lock l i m i t  on t h e  ST-124 platform i n  t h e  
Saturn i s  60° i n  t he  yaw plane.  P r io r  t o  reaching t h i s  l i m i t  onboard 
log ic  limits the  maximum a t t i t u d e  e r r o r  command t o  45'. 
t h e  malfunctions prodiicing the  slow deviations a re  a t t i t u d e  e r r o r  s igna l  
problems of some type ,  yawing beyond these  l i m i t s  s t i l l  i s  not l i k e l y  
t o  change response d ra s t i ca l ly .  
the  yaw plane a l t e rna te  mission limits o r  u n t i l  a possible  spacecraft  
gimbal lock limit. 
Since most cf 
Therefore t h e  burn could be con t inued to  
Spacecraft.- The th ree  gimbal plztforms ( I M U )  i n  t h e  spacecraf t  
present ly  cease t o  provide va l id  a t t i t u d e  information when yawed pas t  85O. 
Many measures have been taken t o  avoid such an occurrence. 
developments during meetings of t h e  Apollo Data P r i o r i t y  Midcourse Techniques 
Group have eliminated t h e  requirement f o r  t h e  e n t i r e  primary guidance and 
navigation cont ro l  subsystem (PCNCS) f o r  some lunar  missions,  which of 
course negates the  requirement f o r  t h e  IMU. It i s  f e l t  t h a t  t he  
s t a b i l i z a t i o n  and cont ro l  subsystem (SCS) provides an adequate backup 
system. With t h i s  i n  mind the re  does not appear t o  be much j u s t i f i c a t i o n  
f o r  TLI shutdown t o  pre-Jent I N  gimbal lock. 
However, recent 
Since most of t h e  malfunctions previously described can produce 
t h i s  problem and i f  f o r  some reason gimbal lock m u s t  be  avoided, time 
( a t t i t u d e  deviat ion)  would have t o  be allowed f o r  the  spacecraf t  t o  
separate  and damp ra t e s .  
If 3 seconds are provided from shutdown t o  SPS ign i t ion ,  Only 55' 
For a 
If we had committed t o  TLI  with no PGNCS, t h e  
yaw a t t i t u d e  excursion from lift-off o r i en ta t ion  could be allowed, 
considering a 10 deg/sec r a t e  l i m i t ,  t o  avoid IMU gimbal lock. 
t y p i c a l  TLI  plane change, t h i s  means a yaw a t t i t u d e  deviat ion of 
42' ( i . e . ,  55' - 13'). 
SCS e lec t ronic  gimbal lock at 75' reduces the  a t t i t u d e  deviat ion l i m i t  
t o  32'. 
In  summary t.0 avoid IMU gimbal lock, an a t t i t u d e  deviat ion l i m i t  of 
about 42' i s  required,  however, s ince  the  crew has three  hours t o  midccurse 
time they could probably rea l ign .  
i s  not a mandatory requirement f o r  TLI  shutdown. 
Therefore, t h e  gimbal lock avoidance 
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S-IVB Disposal 
It i s  noted t h a t  even though pos i t i ve  p i t c h  rates during T L I  r e s u l t  i n  
t he  spacecraft  being post perigee a f t e r  TLI, a low perigee such as allowed 
f o r  a l t e r n a t e  4 may a l s o  provide S-IVB disposal  problems. Reducing 
t h e  allowable pos i t i ve  p i t ch  l i m i t  t o  l e s s  than  60° improves chances of 
a gradually decaying o r b i t  f o r  t h e  S-IVB and may the re fo re  prevent what 
would probak.Ly be a land impact. 
Predictable  Aktitude Variat ions 
Three th ings  should be noted under t h i s  top ic .  The f i r s t  i t e m  
concerns t h e  propel lant  u t i l i z a t i o n  system which can, as observed on t h e  
AS-501 mission, change t h e  expected a t t i t u d e  h i s to ry  of t h e  launch vehicle  
considerably acd s t i l l  be on a good i ra jec tory .  The amount of excursion 
depends pr imari ly  on t h e  amount of l i q u i d  hydrogen ava i l ab le .  It i s  f e l t  
t h a t  t h i s  i t e m  should not inf luence l i m i t  s e t t i n g  because t h e  a t t i t u d e  
excursion i s  predictahle  p r e f l i g h t ,  as i s  t h e  t ime t h e  propulsion u n i t  
(PU) system is  ac t ive .  
case and s ince t h e  remaining S-IVB second burns,  such as TLI  w i l l  occur 
primarily near t h e  horizontal ,  a t t i t u d e  excursions a r e  expected t o  be 
s ign i f i can t ly  l e s s .  
Marshall- Space F l ight  Center doc-ments such as reference 2.  
cur ren t ly  programed t o  go t o  t h e  expected ign i t i on  a t t i t u d e .  
moves t o  a prestored gimbal pos i t ion  regard less  of t h e  parking o r b i t  
dispers ions.  
i n  a 100-n. m i .  c i r cu la r  o r b i t .  After  i g n i t i o n  and ac t ive  guidance b,?gins, 
compensation would be made f o r  t h e  a t t i t u d e .  
was a 100-by 1000-n. m i .  a l t i t u d e  one, t h e  maximum deviat ion would only be 
about 6' , and, of course, t h e  crew would expect t h i s .  
Also,  s ince t h e  AS-501 mission was a spec ia l  a t t i t u d e  
These predicted p r o f i l e s  are usual ly  ava i lab le  i n  
The second item i n  t h i s  category concerns t h e  way t h e  S-IVB i s  
It always 
This could mean it is  aligned i n i t i a l l y  as though it were 
Even i f  t h e  parking o rb i t  
The t h i r d  item concerns other  parking o r b i t  dispers ions and t h e  
e f f ec t s  on burn a t t i t u d e .  Reference 1 0  contains a t t i t u d e  h i s t o r i e s  through 
t h e  E and G mission second S-IVB burns. Dispersions include s t a t e  vec tor ,  
i gn i t i on  time and thrust  e r ro r s .  
general ly  less than  5 O  and are therefore  excluded as shutdown l i m i t s .  
The r e su l t i ng  a t t i t u d e  deviat ions a r e  
General Information 
Several  changes from t h e  monitoring sec t ion  of  reference 1 a r e  
described here for  completeness. 
from t h e  maneuver monitor program 47. 
t h e  components of ve loc i ty  accumulated as measyed i n  spacecraft  cont ro l  
axes - i n e r t i a l  ve loc i ty  ( V I ) ,  a l t i t u d e  r a t e  (h)  and a l t i t u d e  ( h )  are 
The DSKY parameters now ava i lab le  a r e  
I n  addi t ion  t o  L V X ,  AV and AVz - 
Y ,  
a 
avai lable .  
a l t i t d e  (ha) , perigee a l t i t u d e  ( h  ) , and time t o  perigee ( t  ) .  
Also rout ine  30 w i l l  enable t h e  crew t o  monitor apogee 
P P 
The de le t ion  of program 1 5  eliminated a possible  means of TLI cont ro l  
by t h e  CMC and a l so  removed a possible  cue f o r  cutoff as w e l l  as a t t i t u d e  
e r ro r  displays.  
chances of providing a meaningful cutoff  backup a r e  small s ince  only a 
few seconds remain u n t i l  f u e l  deplet ion.  
t .though t h e  AV meter can provide a backup cue f o r  cu to f f ,  
Another s ign i f i can t  chaiige requi res  t ha t  t h e  spacecraft  i n e r t i a l  
reference systems w i l l  be aligned t o  t h e  launch pad alignment, as i s  t h e  
S-IVB, f o r  RTCC and ground cont ro l  convenience. This means t h a t  t h e  
i n i t i a l  p i t ch  a t t i t u d e  of t h e  FDAI d isp lays  can be anything between 0" 
and 360' depending on i n j e c t  ion  opportunity.  
Summary Remarks 
An important ground r u l e  being used by t h e  Midcourse Techniques 
Group t o  e s t ab l i sh  a NO-GO f o r  T L I  
e r ro r s  which are l a rge r  than  c e r t a i n  spec i f i ca t ion  values.  
of l a rge  TLI  a t t i t u d e  deviat ion l i m i t s  i s  somewhat contradictory t o  t h i s  
ground rule. 
re l ies  on detecti i lg Saturn o r  PGNS 
Acceptance 
Perhaps t h e  most s ign i f i can t  i t e m  not ye t  discussed i s  s impl ic i ty .  
Without regard t o  s impl ic i ty ,  t h e  widest acceptable l i m i t s  f o r  shut t ing  
down TLI a r e  + 46" and -43.4' i n  p i t c h  and + 52' and -66" i n  yaw. 
Recall ing t h a t  a t t i t u d e  deviat ion i s  t h e  d i f fe rence  i n  spacecraft  FDAI 
a t t i t u d e  and t h e  nominal a t t i t u d e  at  a given burn time, plus t h e  f a c t  t h a t  
deviat ion can occur i n  a combination p i t ch  and yaw d i r ec t ion ,  it i s  f e l t  
t h a t  one l i m i t  should be used. It i s  the re fo re  suggested t h a t  f o r  
s impl ic i ty  t h e  translunar in j ec t ion  maneuvers be terminated on a t o t a l  
a t t i t u d e  deviat ion l i m i t  of 45" i n  e i t h e r  p i t ch  o r  yaw. The primary 
constraint  not met by t h e  above l i m i t  is  the communications and l i gh t ing  
requirements. I f  an a l t e r n a t i v e  such as previously described i s  not 
acceptable,  smaller l i m i t s  must be imposed and even then t h e  communication 
and l i gh t ing  requirements may not be achieved. 
t h e  las t  few seconds of T L I ,  as i n  t h e  launch phase, ac t ion  by t h e  crew on 
an a t t i t u d e  deviat ion l i m i t  may be dropped because slow deviat ions cannot 
s ign i f i can t ly  jeopardize t h e  t r a j ec to ry .  
It i s  noted t h a t  during 
It i s  emphasized t h a t  t he  probabi l i ty  of a slow deviat ion malfunction 
i s  extremely unl ikely;  however, s ince  they  can occur as w e l l  as cause 
ser ious problems , l i m i t s  a r e  required.  
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Description of Figures 
Typical h i s t o r i e s  of previously discussed parameters a r e  included 
i n  t h e  figures. 
conditions,  DSKY quan t i t i e s  a t t i t u d e  h i s t o r i e s  and geometry va r i a t ions  
a re  provided f o r  both p i t ch  and yaw platform drifts. 
t h e  f igures  involving a l t e r n a t e  mission midcourse AV are conic so lu t ions  
and as a result are approximate. 
I n  addi t ion  t o  t h e  figures used t o  der ive  l i m i t i n g  
It i s  noted t h a t  
CONCLUSIONS 
Disregarding a gimbal locked ST-124 o r  IMU platform and T&D 
communications and l i g h t i n g  cons t r a in t s ,  t o t a l  a t t i t u d e  l i m i t s  which insure 
safe operations and maximum opportunity f o r  a circumlunar a l t e r n a t e  mission 
are + 4 6 O  and -43.4' i n  p i t ch  and +52O and -66' i n  yaw. Because of possible  
inconsis tent  and unfamiliar IMU alignments at  TLI  i gn i t i on  and because 
s impl ic i ty  has always served best 
e i t h e r  p i t ch  or  yaw i s  recommended as TLI shutdown c r i t e r i a .  
a -2otal a t t i t u d e  deviat ion of +- 4 5 O  i n  
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Figure 9. - Osculating apogee altitude as a function of S- IVB platform drift rate. 
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Figure 18. - Osculating apogee altitude as a function of the rotatlon of the l ine  of apsides 
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